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ABSTRACT Several biosafety level 3 and/or 4 (BSL-3/4) pathogens are high-
consequence, single-stranded RNA viruses, and their genomes, when introduced into
permissive cells, are infectious. Moreover, many of these viruses are select agents
(SAs), and their genomes are also considered SAs. For this reason, cDNAs and/or
their derivatives must be tested to ensure the absence of infectious virus and/or vi-
ral RNA before transfer out of the BSL-3/4 and/or SA laboratory. This tremendously
limits the capacity to conduct viral genomic research, particularly the application of
next-generation sequencing (NGS). Here, we present a sequence-independent
method to rapidly amplify viral genomic RNA while simultaneously abolishing both
viral and genomic RNA infectivity across multiple single-stranded positive-sense RNA
(ssRNA) virus families. The process generates barcoded DNA amplicons that range
in length from 300 to 1,000 bp, which cannot be used to rescue a virus and are sta-
ble to transport at room temperature. Our barcoding approach allows for up to 288
barcoded samples to be pooled into a single library and run across various NGS
platforms without potential reconstitution of the viral genome. Our data demon-
strate that this approach provides full-length genomic sequence information not
only from high-titer virion preparations but it can also recover specific viral se-
quence from samples with limited starting material in the background of cellular
RNA, and it can be used to identify pathogens from unknown samples. In summary,
we describe a rapid, universal standard operating procedure that generates high-
quality NGS libraries free of infectious virus and infectious viral RNA.
IMPORTANCE This report establishes and validates a standard operating proce-
dure (SOP) for select agents (SAs) and other biosafety level 3 and/or 4 (BSL-3/4) RNA
viruses to rapidly generate noninfectious, barcoded cDNA amenable for next-
generation sequencing (NGS). This eliminates the burden of testing all processed
samples derived from high-consequence pathogens prior to transfer from high-
containment laboratories to lower-containment facilities for sequencing. Our estab-
lished protocol can be scaled up for high-throughput sequencing of hundreds of
samples simultaneously, which can dramatically reduce the cost and effort required
for NGS library construction. NGS data from this SOP can provide complete genome
coverage from viral stocks and can also detect virus-specific reads from limited start-
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ing material. Our data suggest that the procedure can be implemented and easily
validated by institutional biosafety committees across research laboratories.
KEYWORDS: next-generation sequencing, West Nile virus, alphavirus, coronavirus,
flavivirus, foot-and-mouth disease virus, genomics, picornavirus, rhinovirus
Single-stranded positive-sense RNA (ssRNA) viruses constitute the largest group ofviral agents (1). Even when not encapsidated by viral structural proteins, positive-
sense RNA genomes are sufficient to initiate translation and viral replication upon
introduction into permissive cells. The infectious nature of ssRNA viral genomes has
made them amenable to reverse genetic manipulation for more than 30 years (2, 3).
However, this property is a contributing factor in classifying many ssRNA viruses as
select agents (SAs) under the Federal Select Agent Program (4). Moreover, many
ssRNA viruses are high-priority biosafety level 3 and/or 4 (BSL-3/4) pathogens, with a
subset listed as potential bioterrorism agents by the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (5, 6). An additional complication is that full-length cDNAs from
ssRNA viruses that are SAs can be used to create RNA and rescue/recover the
pathogen. Thus, in some instances, large cDNAs, double-stranded DNAs (dsDNAs), or
clones containing at least two-thirds of the genome may also be regulated as SAs.
Positive-sense RNA viruses span multiple virus families, and the infectious nature of
these genomic RNAs coupled with SA/biosafety/biosecurity concerns inhibit rapid
removal from BSL-3/4 containment (7) or transport and handling of RNA samples that
are known to contain viral genomes from outbreak settings. This poses a challenge for
timely sample processing and sequence analysis, which could significantly hamper
responses during outbreak situations. Typically, all products generated from infectious
material must be proven to no longer contain infectious viral particles or infectious
genomic RNA prior to transfer to a BSL-2 space. Confirming loss of infectivity (LOI)
typically occurs via blind infectivity testing, where a subset of the material is placed on
a permissive cell line for at least three subsequent passages (8). For this reason,
transferring cDNAs or other nucleic acids from a BSL-3/4 laboratory to a BSL-2 labora-
tory is a very difficult and time-consuming process for many laboratories. Some
investigators have worked out procedures that have been approved by their institu-
tional biosafety committee; however, these procedures vary from institution to insti-
tution. For example, some BSL-3 facilities work with mosquito-transmitted ssRNA
viruses including West Nile virus (WNV) and Chikungunya virus (CHIKV) that are not
considered SAs. Other BSL-3 facilities contain ssRNA viruses such as severe acute
respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus
(VEEV) that are classified as SAs, but these facilities have safety protocols that allow
transfer of genomic RNA or cDNA from BSL-3 to BSL-2 directly by scientists. Finally,
there are BSL-3 facilities working with SAs such as foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDV)
at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC). Here, only trained safety personnel
are allowed to transfer cDNA samples from high-containment laboratories to BSL-2
laboratories after inactivation has been carried out under a validated protocol. For each
of these scenarios, a robust, universal standard operating procedure (SOP) to eliminate
infectious material while rapidly generating next-generation sequencing (NGS) libraries
is critically needed.
FMDV illustrates the majority of the SA, biosafety, and biosecurity issues surrounding
high-consequence RNA viruses (9). Among the foreign animal disease viruses, FMDV is
the most contagious and has historically set standards for biosafety and biosecurity
policies and procedures. The required biosafety level to carry out any infectious virus
work with FMDV is biosafety level 3 agriculture (BSL-3Ag), and currently, the only facility
authorized to work with FMDV in the United States is PIADC (BSL-3Ag safety consid-
erations reviewed in references 10 and 11). The fact that the viral RNA and RNA derived
from infected samples can be infectious when transfected or electroporated into
susceptible cells results in strict regulation of any nucleic acid derived from FMDV-
infected material. Currently, the only approved methodology to remove FMDV nucleic
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acids from the BSL-3Ag laboratory at PIADC involves harsh alkaline and thermal
treatment that potentially has a deleterious effect on putative NGS libraries (12; M.
McIntosh, personal communication). In addition, removal of material derived from
diverse BSL-3/4 ssRNA pathogens out of containment requires time-consuming
procedures (e.g., multiple blind infectivity passages) to rule out the presence of
infectious material. This tremendously limits the capacity to conduct genomic research
with viral samples, particularly the application of NGS techniques to understand viral
pathogenesis, viral ecology, and vaccine development.
For the reasons presented, there is substantial need for a universal SOP to generate
cDNA that rapidly and reproducibly inactivates BSL-3/4 viruses that can be easily
assessed by institutional biosafety committees (IBC), which speeds the transfer of
nucleic acids from high-containment laboratories to BSL-2 laboratories, and enables
rapid introduction into a variety of NGS pipelines. Here, we present a robust SOP for
generating high-quality, barcoded cDNAs directly from genomic RNA across multiple
virus families. Families represented include Picornaviridae, Alphaviridae, Flaviviridae, and
Coronaviridae, which have genome sizes from ~7 kb to 28 kb. The strategy builds upon
established sequence-independent single-primer amplification (SISPA) methods (13-
15). Our data prove that barcoded NGS sequencing libraries can be rapidly generated
while simultaneously destroying both viral particle and genomic RNA infectivity. Our
approach is scalable, highly adaptable, and sensitive. The SOP generates high-quality
sequences spanning the entire genome, up to 288 pooled barcoded samples can be
examined in a single NGS run, and the products of the SOP work on multiple NGS
platforms (e.g., Illumina MiSeq, HiSeq, NextSeq, and Ion Torrent). The SOP works on
starting material of purified virus, tissue culture samples, or tissue samples. We are able
to detect virus-specific reads in samples where the input is fewer than 10 PFU and can
identify viruses present in an unknown sample. Therefore, this application has potential
for rapid sequencing of high-titer viral stocks as well as virus discovery and/or forensics.
Finally, the nonspecific nature of the amplification makes this SOP adaptable to
negative-strand RNA viruses (ssRNA), double-strand RNA (dsRNA), single-strand DNA
(ssDNA), or double-strand DNA (dsDNA) viruses.
RESULTS
The SOP rapidly generates noninfectious, barcoded DNA libraries for ssRNA
viruses. An overview of our approach illustrates nine major steps (Fig. 1A). First, viral
RNA is isolated using a commercially available RNeasy kit or Trizol. Second, purified viral
RNA is used as a template for sequence-independent cDNA synthesis, and a random
library of barcoded PCR products is constructed. Third, DNA products of the SOP are
treated with RNase. Fourth, SOP products are purified. At this point, we tested all
products of the SOP for loss of viral infectivity and for the absence of infectious
full-length viral genomic RNA. This step is not highlighted yellow in Fig. 1 and is not
included in the final SOP, since the methods are virus specific. Fifth, immediately prior
to transfer, all samples are heated at 72°C for 30 min to inactivate any potential virus
contamination that could inadvertently occur during cDNA generation and purification
(16). Sixth, all samples are transferred from BSL-3/4 to BSL-2 space. Seventh, products
from the SOP are pooled and subjected to NGS library construction. Eighth, libraries are
sequenced. Ninth, sequence data are analyzed and computationally assembled in
standard office space. A full detailed protocol for the SOP is provided in our supple-
mental methods (Text S1 in the supplemental material).
Sequence-independent single-primer amplification (SISPA) utilizes a random hex-
amer primer coupled to a unique barcode (BC-N6 [Fig. 1B]). The BC-N6 oligonucleotide
generates single-stranded cDNA from input RNA and double-stranded DNA by ran-
domly priming the synthesized cDNA. Finally, a PCR step with primers encoding only
the barcode sequence amplifies and uniquely barcodes a sample. As a result, small PCR
products are generated with unique barcodes on each terminus of randomly primed
amplicons. A representative gel image displays products of the SOP obtained from
serial dilutions of genomic human rhinovirus 16 (HRV-16) virion RNA. At high input RNA
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amounts, a smear between 200 bp and 1 kb is visible. This signal intensity diminishes
as the starting material is diluted (Fig. 1C).
Upstream steps may be required prior to initiating the SOP. When starting from a
high-titer virus stock, directly proceeding to the SOP (Fig. 1A) will provide the investi-
gator with sufficient sample purity to obtain viral sequence data that spans the majority
of the viral genome. For a heterogeneous sample (e.g., virus-infected cells), a host RNA
depletion step, such as rRNA or mRNA removal may be required to enrich for virus-
specific sequences before proceeding to the SOP (Fig. 1D).
The SOP recovers full-length genomic sequence data across multiple ss-
RNA virus families.We sought to perform the SOP in multiple laboratories and test
diverse virus families. Therefore, a standardized version of the SOP was distributed to
laboratories that have expertise working with various ssRNA virus families (17-19). For
proof-of-principle experiments, work was performed with both BSL-2 and BSL-3 ss-
RNA viruses. Representative genomic coverage for FMDV, WNV, HRV-16, CHIKV, and
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) obtained from Illumina
MiSeq sequencing illustrates that 99.9 to 98% genome coverage was achieved for each
virus (Fig. 2A to E). Areas where low coverage was observed include the terminal 5= and
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FIG 1 Overview of the proposed standard operating procedure (SOP) for rapid next-generation
sequencing library preparation and inactivation of ssRNA viruses. (A) Stepwise overview of the SOP.
A detailed protocol is provided in Text S1 in the supplemental material. Steps in the pink box denote
work performed in a biosafety level 3 and/or 4 (BSL-3/4) laboratory. Steps in the blue box denote
work that can be performed in a BSL-2 laboratory. The asterisk in step 1 indicates that for nonselect
agent pathogens (e.g., West Nile virus), extracted RNA may be moved to BSL-2 for library construc-
tion. Step 1, generating cDNA and SISPA, utilizes a primer with a random hexamer coupled to a
unique barcode (BC-N6). SISPA stands for sequence-independent single-primer amplification. (B) The
BC-N6 primer is used for both generating single-stranded cDNA from input RNA and generating
double-stranded DNA by randomly priming the synthesized cDNA. A PCR step using primers only
encoding the barcode sequence with either three or four random nucleotides (3N/4N) at the 5= end
simultaneously amplifies and uniquely identifies (barcodes) a sample. (C) Representative gel image
that displays products of the SOP obtained from serial dilutions of genomic human rhinovirus 16
(HRV-16) virion RNA. At high-input RNA amounts, a smear between 200 bp and 1,000 bp is visible.
This signal intensity diminishes as the starting material is diluted. (D) Summary of diverse types of
starting material which can feed into the SOP. Samples enriched for virus-specific sequence (e.g.,
virion stocks) can directly proceed to the SOP. For samples that contain a majority of host nucleic
acid, the use of upstream procedures to enrich for virus-specific signal (e.g., rRNA depletion or mRNA
enhancement) is recommended.
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3= ends of the genome and large homopolymer regions, such as the poly(C) region
present in the 5= untranslated region (5=-UTR) of FMDV (20). To date, we have se-
quenced 299 FMDV samples, 49 MERS-CoV samples, 175 WNV samples, 224 HRV (both
HRV-14 and -16) samples, and 25 CHIKV samples (representative data from each family
are summarized in Table S2 in the supplemental material). An advantage of this system
is the ability to create a single library from hundreds of barcoded samples rather than
hundreds of libraries, dramatically reducing the time and cost associated with reagents
and labor. In cases where the sequences are of sufficient depth, minor variants that
differ from the provided reference sequence may be determined using bioinformatic
pipelines that integrate CLCbio software (21) and custom software. Representative WNV
data (Fig. 2; Table S1) was subjected to minor variant analysis, and we identified 11 base
changes from the reference sequence (GenBank accession no. AF404756.1). These
changes were a combination of three engineered mutations (positions 8859, 8862, and
8880) (22) and eight additional changes present in the virus stock, serving as a control
for our sequencing and analyses.
The SOP destroys infectious genomic RNA across multiple virus families.
We next sought to evaluate the ability of the SOP to inactivate infectious genomic RNA
(gRNA) and infectious virus. High-titer samples of coronaviruses, flaviviruses, alphavi-
ruses, and picornaviruses were processed, and an aliquot of each sample was used to
test for infectious virus or infectious viral gRNA (see Materials and Methods and
Table 1). Currently, blind passaging of potentially infectious material on permissive cells
is a standard assay for infectivity. Negative results from blind passages are often
required to remove products out of a BSL-3 facility. This method can detect infectious
virus from as little as 1 PFU or from infectious viral gRNA of limited genomes (Table 1).
No viral infectivity is present after testing of 309 samples derived from six different
ssRNA viruses (Table 1). Moreover, no genomic RNA infectivity is present after testing
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FIG 2 The SOP generates high-quality full-genome sequence data across multiple ssRNA virus
families. Pooled samples from the SOP were sequenced on the Illumina MiSeq platform. Samples
were demultiplexed, the adaptors were trimmed, and low-quality sequencing reads were removed.
Sequencing reads were mapped corresponding to input viruses. These viruses include foot-and-
mouth disease virus (FMDV) type O (GenBank accession no. KF112887.1) (A), West Nile virus (WNV)
AF404756.1) (B), human rhinovirus 16 (HRV-16) (GenBank accession no. L24917.1) (C), Chikungunya
virus (CHIKV) (pJM6-3-CHIKV 181/25-mkate) (D), and Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus
(MERS) (GenBank accession no. KJ614529.1) (E). Nucleotide coverage depth (NT coverage) is indi-
cated on the y axis, and nucleotide (NT) position is indicated on the x axis. The genome length for
each virus is indicated on the x axis, and the percentage of the genome covered greater than 3
nucleotides is indicated. For FMDV, WNV, HRV-16, and CHIKV, data represent material from a single
barcode. For MERS, the data shown is a combination of four barcodes generated from the same
sample.
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324 samples. In all cases, positive-control samples confirmed that each cell line clearly
detected both viral infectivity and gRNA infectivity. While these results suggest that the
SOP completely inactivates infectious material, an additional heat inactivation step was
included to further reduce the risk of residual infectious material leaving BSL-3/4
containment. Heat treatment at 72°C for 30 min completely abolishes infectious
HRV-16, WNV, and all seven FMDV serotypes (see Table S3 in the supplemental
material). Heat inactivation for CHIKV and MERS-CoV was not performed, but our data
indicate the ability of the SOP to eliminate infectivity from both enveloped and
nonenveloped ssRNA viruses. Moreover, high-quality sequence is recovered after
heat inactivation of the SISPA products for both WNV and HRV-16 (see Fig. S1 in the
supplemental material). It is important to note that for non-SA viruses, the RNA may be
removed to the BSL-2 in RNA lysis buffer prior to cDNA generation if approved by the
individual’s institutional biosafety committee (IBC).
The SOP completely abolishes gRNA infectivity at multiple steps. Our initial
results demonstrate that the SOP removes all gRNA infectivity from starting material
derived from high-titer ssRNA viral stocks. We next initiated experiments to define a
specific step in the SOP where gRNA infectivity is abolished, working with the small RNA
virus HRV-16, which is highly infectious when introduced into permissive cells (23). We
first determined that the limit of detectable RNA infectivity for HRV-16 occurs in the
range between 0.1 and 0.01 PFU on H1 HeLa cells (Table 1). Next, gRNA from HRV-16
(1  106 PFU equivalents per sample) were subjected to either the entire SOP or
stopped at intermediate steps (diagrammed in Fig. 3A). Briefly, 10 replicates for select
steps in the SOP were transfected into H1 HeLa cells. First, purified HRV-16 RNA from
106 PFU was transfected into H1 HeLa cells prior to initiating the SOP (positive control
for transfection). Second, the SOP was stopped after PCR amplification, and the PCR
TABLE 1 SISPA products lack both viral and RNA infectivitya
Input virus
for SISPAb Locationc
Viral infectivity testsd RNA infectivity testse
Cell line
LODf (PFU)
[no. positive/
no. tested]
Loss of infectivity
(no. positive/
no. tested) Cell line
LODf (GE)
[no. positive/
no. tested]
Loss of infectivity
(no. positive/
no. tested)
HRV-16 JCVI H1 HeLa 0.01 [0/2] 0/44 H1 HeLa 7.24  104 [2/2] 0/44
0.1 [2/2] 0/13
HRV-14 JCVI H1 HeLa NT 0/44 H1 HeLa NT 0/44
FMDV USDA LFBK v6 NT 0/90 LFBK v6 4.23  105 0/90
0/93 0/93
0/1
0/1
CHIKV UNC-CH Vero 0.1 [1/3] 0/25 BHK-21 107 [2/2] 0/25
1 [3/3] 0/1 0/2
WNV UW Vero 0.1 [1/3] 0/3 BHK-21 107 [3/3] 0/3
1 [3/3]
MERS-CoV UMD Vero NT 0/3 Vero NT 0/10
aHigh-titer samples of representative coronaviruses (MERS-CoV), flaviviruses (WNV), alphaviruses (CHIKV), and picornaviruses (HRV-16, HRV-14, and FMDV) were
processed following the SOP, and an aliquot of each sample was used to test for infectious virus or infectious viral genomic RNA (gRNA). Currently, blind passaging
of potentially infectious material on permissive cells is the standard for removing products out of a BSL-3 facility. Viral and gRNA infectivity is absent after testing all
samples. In all cases, positive-control samples confirmed each cell line clearly detected both viral infectivity and gRNA infectivity.
bThe starting material represents viral RNA from at least 1  105 PFU. A total of 324 samples were tested for genomic RNA loss of infectivity; 309 samples tested for
virus loss of infectivity.
cAbbreviations: JCVI, J. Craig Venter Institute; USDA, U.S. Department of Agriculture; UNC-CH, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; UW, University of Wisconsin—
Madison; UMD, University of Maryland.
dSISPA products were used to infect the indicated permissive cell line. Three serial passages were performed.
eSISPA products were either electroporated or transfected into the indicated permissive cell line. Three serial passages were performed.
fThe limit of detection (LOD) for viral and gRNA infectivity was determined independently from the loss of infectivity testing for each virus. For each loss of infectivity
test, a positive control for infectivity (either transfection/electroporation of gRNA or virus infection) was performed in parallel. Abbreviations: NT, not tested; GE,
genomic equivalents.
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products were purified. Third, the SOP was used to generate PCR products, which
were treated with 2 l of an RNase cocktail and purified. Fourth, the final products
from the SOP were heat inactivated (which encompasses the entire SOP). As a
control for the efficacy of the RNase cocktail, RNA from 106 PFU of HRV-16 was
treated with the amount of RNase from the SOP. Material from each group was then
transfected into H1 HeLa cells and subjected to three blind passages to demon-
strate that infectivity was destroyed.
Results clearly indicate that all infectious gRNA is removed at the step of PCR
(Fig. 3B), likely resulting from the temperature cycling conditions. However, we cannot
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FIG 3 Performing the SOP with both HRV-16 and FMDV to identify where loss of genomic RNA
infectivity occurs. (A) Flow chart depicting a test for HRV-16 or FMDV loss of RNA infectivity. Briefly,
60 tubes of HRV-16 gRNA were subject to six different conditions in replicates of 10. The SOP was
performed, and a subset was purified at each step and tested for the presence of infectious RNA over
three blind passages on H1 HeLa cells. For FMDV, viral RNA, intermediates, or the final SOP products
were electroporated into LFBK v6 cells. (B) Results of infectivity testing with HRV-16. Each symbol
represents the value for an individual sample. Samples to the right of the red line highlight steps
where all samples tested had no detectable infectious HRV-16 genomic RNA. The “Viral RNARNase”
group demonstrates the RNase treatment is sufficient to inactivate all infectious gRNA. (C) Results of
infectivity testing with FMDV as outlined in panel A. Each symbol represents the value for an
individual sample. Samples to the right of the red line highlight steps where all samples tested had
no detectable infectious FMDV genomic RNA.
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rule out the contribution of RNase H in the cDNA synthesis step to the degradation of
infectious gRNA (described in the supplemental SOP [Text S1 in the supplemental
material]). Moreover, the subsequent RNase step and final heat treatment for 30 min at
72°C serve as additional safety checkpoints. Our data suggest that both the PCR step
and the downstream RNase cocktail inactivate gRNA from at least 1  106 PFU
equivalents for HRV-16, proving that the ability of the SOP to inactivate gRNA is
extremely robust. To build on the data obtained with HRV-16, a similar approach was
followed with FMDV (Fig. 3). Corroborating the HRV-16 results, FMDV gRNA infectivity
is abolished post-PCR in the absence of the RNase cocktail (Fig. 3C). These two
experiments highlight that the SOP efficiently inactivates all infectious gRNA at an early
step in the SOP and that subsequent steps serve as additional fail-safes for inactivation.
This is true for both FMDV and HRV-16, and supports data in Table 1 which clearly
demonstrate that the SOP abolishes gRNA infectivity across diverse virus families.
Limiting dilution experiments with the SOP identify comparable sensitiv-
ities between the Illumina MiSeq and HiSeq platforms. To determine the
sensitivity of the SOP across multiple sequencing platforms, we sequenced identical
libraries generated from the SOP with both MiSeq and HiSeq. Representative data from
a serial dilution experiment shows that the limit of detection (LOD) for HRV-16-specific
sequencing reads was approximately 2.5 PFU (Fig. 4). The HiSeq platform produces an
average of 5- to 7-fold-more sequencing reads for each sample. However, these
additional reads do not improve the overall genome coverage nor the limit of detection
(Fig. 4). Therefore, we conclude that the MiSeq platform is able to sequence all viral
reads present in each library and that the HiSeq platform simply derives more se-
quences from the same starting material.
Evaluating the sensitivity of the SOP from purified virions, purified viral
genomic RNA, and mixed samples. We next sought to further define the SOP limits
of detection on a MiSeq platform and directly compare this sensitivity to sequence-
specific quantitative real-time reverse transcriptase PCR (qrRT-PCR). Separate experi-
ments with dilutions of HRV-16 virions and HRV-16 gRNA in both pure (cell-free
supernatant containing virions) and mixed (cellular RNA spiked with HRV-16) samples
were performed. For test 1 (Fig. 5A), a virion dilution series precedes RNA extraction,
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FIG 4 Defining the sensitivity of the SOP on Illumina MiSeq and HiSeq platforms. RNA from serial
10-fold dilutions of an HRV-16 virion stock was treated according to the SOP. Samples were pooled
and sequenced on an Illumina MiSeq or HiSeq platform. The left y axis denotes the number of reads
mapped to the HRV-16 reference genome, the right y axis denotes the percentage of the reference
genome covered, and the x axis denotes the input PFU for each reaction. The solid black line
demonstrates that sequencing reads were detected between 1 and 10 PFU on the MiSeq platform.
A similar sensitivity is obtained on the HiSeq platform, as denoted by the solid red line. The
corresponding percentage of the HRV-16 genomic coverage from each platform is denoted by a
dashed black line (MiSeq) and a dashed red line (HiSeq). The slight enhancement of genomic
coverage on the MiSeq platform, despite the fewer number of sequence reads, results from the
longer read length on the MiSeq platform (300 nucleotides [nt]) over the HiSeq platform (100 nt), as
sequencing capacity is in excess at all dilutions.
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followed by the SOP. For test 2 (Fig. 5B), virion RNA was extracted from a high-titer
stock, followed by serial dilution, and aliquots from each dilution were subjected to the
SOP. For test 3 (Fig. 5C), virion dilutions described in test 1 were mixed with HeLa cells.
Total RNA was extracted from each tube, and rRNA was removed before proceeding to
the SOP. For test 4 (Fig. 5D), aliquots from each dilution of viral RNA described in test
2 were added to 1 g of total HeLa cell RNA. rRNA was removed, and the material was
subjected to the SOP.
Representative MiSeq data (black line) from each test is displayed in Fig. 5A to D as
the number of HRV-16-specific sequencing reads per sample. Prior to initiating the SOP,
an aliquot of diluted RNA from each sample was analyzed by qrRT-PCR to determine the
input viral RNA copy number (red line). This input value provides a comparison for the
sequence read output. The approximate qrRT-PCR and MiSeq LODs for this experiment
are as follows: qrRT-PCR LOD of 8.33 PFU and MiSeq LOD of 83.3 PFU in test 1, qrRT-PCR
LOD of 8.33 PFU and MiSeq LOD of 83.3 PFU in test 2, qrRT-PCR LOD of 2.78 PFU and
MiSeq LOD of 162 PFU in test 3, and qrRT-PCR LOD of 8.33 PFU and MiSeq LOD of
27 PFU in test 4. As expected, qrRT-PCR is more sensitive than MiSeq sequencing is.
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FIG 5 NGS on SOP-generated HRV-16-specific sequence from pure and mixed samples is slightly less sensitive than quantitative
real-time RT-PCR (qrRT-PCR). Four independent tests were conducted to determine the sensitivity of the SOP. Test 1 detects
HRV-16 sequence from dilutions of purified virus. Test 2 detects HRV-16 sequence from dilutions of genomic RNA. Test 3 detects
HRV-16 sequence from dilutions of virus spiked into H1 HeLa cells. Test 4 detects HRV-16 sequence from genomic RNA dilutions
spiked into total HeLa cell RNA. A ribosomal removal step was performed for tests 3 and 4 prior to the initiation of the SOP. For
each sample, a fraction of the RNA used to initiate the SOP was subjected to qrRT-PCR analysis. (A to D) HRV-16-specific reads
obtained by MiSeq (black solid lines) are plotted on the left y axis and the cycle threshold (Ct) values are plotted on the right
y axis (red lines). Sequencing reads not mapping to the HRV-16 reference are also indicated (black dashed lines). Corresponding
HRV-16 input PFU values are plotted on the x axis. (A) The limit of detection (LOD) for test 1 in this experiment is between 101
and 102 input PFU. The corresponding LOD by qrRT-PCR is approximately 10-fold greater (100 to 101 input PFU). (B) The LOD for
test 2 in this experiment is between 101 and 102 input PFU. The corresponding LOD by qrRT-PCR is approximately 10-fold greater
(100 to 101 input PFU). (C) The LOD for test 3 in this experiment is between 102 and 103 input PFU. The corresponding LOD by
qrRT-PCR is approximately 100-fold greater (100 to 101 input PFU). (D) The LOD for test 4 in this experiment is between 101 and
102 input PFU; however, single reads are detected down to an input of 101. The corresponding LOD by qrRT-PCR is
approximately 10-fold greater (100 to 101 input PFU) when individual HRV-16 reads are not considered and approximately 10-fold
less sensitive when individual HRV-16 reads are considered.
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However, the SOP has the advantage over qrRT-PCR of requiring no a priori knowledge
of the sequence of interest and has the benefit of providing sequence information from
both known and unknown samples.
Evaluating the sensitivity of the SOP in WNV-infected cells and tissues. We
further evaluated the ability of the SOP to detect WNV in the context of cells or whole
tissue. Limiting dilutions of WNV-infected cells were spiked into uninfected cells
(Fig. 6A) or uninfected tissues (Fig. 6B). Our method detects WNV-specific reads from as
few as 10 infected cells spiked into uninfected cells (Fig. 6A) and as few as 100 infected
cells spiked into uninfected tissues (Fig. 6B). Another experiment was designed to
determine the ability of the SOP to detect WNV-specific sequencing reads in both
acutely and persistently infected mouse tissues. For this study, the SOP was performed
to generate libraries from the footpad (site of inoculation) and the brain (target organ
of WNV) at days 5, 10, and 29; both tissues support viral production with infectious virus
present for at least 1 month after inoculation (18, 24). Samples were pooled and
sequenced on eight HiSeq lanes to ensure sufficient sequencing depth for a proper
analysis, yielding between 20 and 90 million reads per sample. Viral loads peak in the
footpad at day 5 and diminish by day 29 (Fig. 6C), while peak brain titers occur at day
10 postinoculation (Fig. 6D). Furthermore, virus-specific reads were detected in the
brain of one animal at 29 days postinfection, which underscores the power of the SOP
to detect low levels of virus in a natural infection.
The SOP can accurately identify “unknown” samples. To test the ability of the
SOP to recover viral sequence from an unknown sample source, three viral stocks were
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FIG 6 The SOP can detect WNV infection in vitro and in vivo. (A and B) Infected WNV cells were spiked into uninfected cells (A) or uninfected tissues (B),
libraries were prepared on RNA according to the SOP, and the libraries were examined by Illumina MiSeq. (C and D) Footpad (C) and brain tissue (D) from
WNV-infected mice were analyzed at 5, 10, and 29 days postinfection for WNV-specific sequence reads by Illumina HiSeq. (A) Data representing the ability
of the SOP to identify WNV-specific reads from limiting dilutions of WNV-infected Vero cells spiked into uninfected 293T cells. Mapped and unmapped
reads from each sample are displayed. (B) The SOP identifies WNV-specific reads from limiting dilutions of WNV-infected Vero cells spiked into uninfected
mouse tissues (spleen and brain). Mapped and unmapped reads from each sample are shown. (C) WNV was detected in the footpad RNA of mice prepared
according to the SOP at the indicated times postinfection. (D) WNV-specific reads can be detected from brain tissue RNA of mice at the indicated times
postinfection. For panels C and D, three mice per group were analyzed, and WNV-mapped and unmapped reads are shown.
Moser et al.
Volume 1 Issue 3 e00039-15 msystems.asm.org 10
subjected to the SOP, anonymized, and shipped to the J. Craig Venter Institute (JCVI)
for sequencing and data analysis in a blind manner (Fig. 7A). Raw data underwent de
novo assembly, and large contigs (500 bp) were used to identify the best full-length
viral genome references by a nucleotide BLAST search. Sequencing reads were then
mapped onto the selected reference genome, and mapping coverage was determined
(Fig. 7). For St. Louis encephalitis virus (SLEV), Western equine encephalomyelitis virus
(WEEV), and Chikungunya virus (CHIKV), we obtained more than 98% genome cover-
age, clearly demonstrating the ability of the SOP to rapidly identify ssRNA viruses
from samples without prior information. In addition, we successfully identified an
“unknown” sample, which was a mix of four different viral RNAs (WNV, SLEV, WEEV, and
CHIKV) (data not shown).
DISCUSSION
The core objective of a biosafety program is the containment of potentially harmful
biological and infectious agents. Standardization of lab practices at all BSLs are defined
(7), but the transfer of potentially infectious material out of high-containment facilities
is very challenging and is sometimes the source of containment breaches. Likewise,
during outbreak situations, the need to handle samples containing potentially infec-
tious viral genomes (or genetic material falling under SA regulations) under high
containment may significantly hinder public health responses. In this report, we
demonstrate the development of a robust SOP for generating high-quality cDNAs from
ssRNA viruses, which can be used in highly parallel processes to quickly and safely
remove samples from BSL-3/4 containment for subsequent genomic sequencing or
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FIG 7 The ability of the SOP to sequence and identify unknown samples. (A) High-titer viral stocks were
subjected to the SOP, anonymized, and shipped to JCVI for sequencing and data analysis. Samples were
pooled and sequenced by Illumina MiSeq. Data from each corresponding sample were put into de novo
assembly, and large contigs (>500 bp) were used to identify the best full-length viral genome references by
nucleotide BLAST search against the NT database. Raw data were then mapped onto the best available
reference genome. (B) Mapping coverage of an unknown sample against the selected genome for St. Louis
encephalitis virus (SLEV). (C) Mapping coverage of an unknown sample against the selected genome for
Western equine encephalitis virus (WEEV). (D) Mapping coverage of an unknown against the selected genome
for Chikungunya virus (CHIKV). In panels B to D, nucleotide coverage depth is indicated on the y axis, and
genomic position, with the length of each genome indicated as well as the best available reference genome,
is indicated on the x axis.
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other similar procedures in BSL-2 laboratories. Protocols to generate NGS sequencing
libraries for ssRNA viruses do exist. For example, a recent report (20) describes a
method for FMDV whole-genome sequencing, but it was not proven to destroy
infectious material. In addition to complete genome coverage, our data confirm that
full-length RNAs, cDNAs, or dsDNAs from these processes cannot be used to recover/
rescue infectious viruses. We demonstrate that this SOP completely inactivates viruses
from diverse virus families classified as SAs or considered high-consequence pathogens.
The SOP removes infectious genomic RNAs and simultaneously amplifies barcoded
cDNAs that cannot be used to rescue/recover viruses (Table 1 and Fig. 3). The SOP also
generates high-quality cDNA libraries, and the resulting NGS data covers almost entire
ssRNA viral genomes from samples tested (Fig. 2 and 4). The SISPA method is unable
to fully define viral genomic termini, since the method utilizes random hexamer
priming. Therefore, additional protocols, such as rapid amplification of cDNA ends
(RACE) are required for this sequence information. The procedure is sequence inde-
pendent and can be utilized on both known and unknown viruses (new/emerging),
regardless of prior genome information. Sequence independence also enables simul-
taneous identification of multiple pathogens in a sample (e.g., coinfections) or even
modified, manufactured pathogens. The described strategy is efficient, scalable, and
inexpensive and requires only reagents and equipment that are commonly used in
BSL-3/4 laboratories, whereas NGS sequencing equipment is expensive and difficult to
maintain, especially within high-containment laboratories.
This SOP builds on the established SISPA method (13, 14) to create small overlap-
ping fragments that are barcoded (i.e., uniquely tagged) by the addition of nucleotides
to the termini. Our barcoding system has many advantages. (i) The barcoded DNAs
cannot be used to recover/rescue viruses, so they can be safely transferred to BSL-2
sequencing centers onsite or shipped to large-scale sequencing centers. (ii) Our system
allows for the PCR amplification of the genomic material (thus, limited amounts of
sample or low copy number can yield whole genomes). (iii) It can be scaled up for
high-throughput sequencing of hundreds of samples simultaneously, which can dra-
matically reduce the cost and effort required for NGS library construction.
Collaboratively, the SOP has been performed more than 1,000 times in multiple
laboratories to demonstrate that full-length genomic sequences can be obtained, and
it can be used to detect very small amounts of viral nucleic acid approaching the
sensitivity of qrRT-PCR. The strategy can be applied to diverse starting material such as
cell culture supernatants, infected-cell monolayers, and animal tissues. While much of
the representative data shown was derived from Illumina MiSeq, the SOP can be
applied to multiple platforms, including Illumina HiSeq and Ion Torrent Personal
Genome Machine (PGM). The PGM provides a rapid turnaround time, which allows for
viral sequence data to be obtained in hours compared to longer times required for
Illumina platforms. An interesting result from this study was the observation that both
the Illumina MiSeq and HiSeq platforms have similar limits of detection on identical
NGS libraries (Fig. 4). This is likely because the MiSeq platform sequences most
virus-specific molecules in the library, and the HiSeq platform only adds more reads
from the same starting material. It is important to note that the HiSeq platform is still
relevant for host gene expression analysis, since additional sequencing depth is critical
to provide adequate coverage across all mammalian mRNAs. We are also able to
directly compare the sensitivity of the SOP to sequence-specific quantitative qrRT-PCR
methods (Fig. 5). While qrRT-PCR is more sensitive, it requires prior knowledge of the
sequence of interest, while SISPA does not. Further, we can detect HRV-16-specific
sequence from both limiting amounts of HRV-16 virion RNA and from samples where
the majority of the sequence data are host derived. We demonstrate the ability to
detect low levels of WNV-specific sequence from persistently infected mouse tissues as
late as 29 days postinfection (Fig. 6). Future studies will optimize the SOP to improve
assay sensitivity to further reduce sequencing cost in samples with limited starting
material. However, these data illustrate the value of this protocol for virus discovery
and/or forensic analyses.
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Extensive effort was directed toward proving the SOP abolishes viral and genomic
infectivity across virus families. Our experimental design is sufficient to state with high
confidence that the SOP abolishes infectivity because of the following. (i) The input
infectious dose for each sample is high. (ii) The limit of detection for each infectivity test
is low. (iii) The sample size is sufficiently high. It is important to note that to assign a
confidence interval for this assay, there must be some failures or variability in the final
outcome (e.g., cultures positive for infectivity during loss of infectivity testing). Our
processing of all samples since the initiation of the experiment has a success rate of
100% (Table 1). The ability to demonstrate that all RNA infectivity is lost after the PCR
step for both HRV-16 and FMDV (Fig. 3) strongly suggests that a final RNase step serves
as an additional safeguard to remove infectious RNA. Finally, the heat step of 72°C for
30 min ensures no residual infectivity due to lab contamination is present prior to
transfer from BSL-3 to BSL-2 (see Table S3 and Fig. S1 in the supplemental material).
However, this step is considered fail-safe, as we demonstrate that infectivity is abol-
ished after the PCR step (Fig. 3).
Applying NGS to sequencing RNA viruses represents an unparalleled capacity to
generate large amounts of sequence data, which can be used to identify consensus
sequences as well as minor sequence variants, or quasispecies, present in a viral
population (25). Limited FMDV population diversity studies explore both intrasample
variation during serial passage and the presence of FMDV quasispecies within an
infected animal (26, 27); therefore, the described SOP is especially promising for FMDV
genomic analyses. To overcome the cost and time limitation of using conventional NGS
protocols for FMDV studies in large data sets, a previous study combined NGS and
Sanger data with sequences available in public databases to study microevolutionary
processes of FMDV populations at multiple scales (28). A protocol to generate consen-
sus level genome sequences for FMDV and a few other positive-sense polyadenylated
RNA viruses has been reported (20), but it was exclusively tested on an Illumina MiSeq
platform. In contrast, our SOP provides extra versatility and cost efficiency, as it has
been adapted to multiple sequencing platforms, and it allows analysis of up to 288
barcoded samples in a single run. Therefore, the scalability and cost-efficiency of the
SOP described here make it a promising approach to examine quasispecies from large
data sets, and it can provide sufficient sequencing depth to examine minor variants
from high-titer stocks (see Table S1 in the supplemental material). Consistent with
previous observations (20), we also found lowest coverage in highly structured or
repetitive regions of the 5=-UTR. Further optimization of the SOP is required to
investigate low-level viral populations or structurally difficult genomic areas from all
starting material (25).
Rapidly evolving NGS technologies have improved our ability to discover novel viral
sequences across diverse sample types (29, 30). Transcriptomics, analyzed historically
through microarray and more recently by NGS, represent another approach to identify
both known and novel viral sequences in a given sample (reviewed in reference 31).
Alternative virus discovery approaches have utilized degenerate primers for specific
virus families, virus-specific probes (32), and random primers for signal amplification
and subsequent NGS library construction (13, 14). Our SISPA approach couples a
barcode sequence and random hexamer in a single oligonucleotide and requires no
prior knowledge of the sample composition (Fig. 7). Moreover, HRV-16 data demon-
strate the ability to obtain HRV-16-specific reads from gRNA corresponding to fewer
than 10 PFU (Fig. 4). Importantly, the final products of the SOP are small dsDNA
fragments flanked by sequence barcodes and therefore can be safely and stably
shipped to a sequencing facility in the absence of a cold chain.
In summary, this universal SOP for cDNA production that reproducibly inactivates
infectivity of BSL-3/4 viruses will speed the transfer of nucleic acids from high-
containment laboratories to BSL-2 laboratories where NGS can be rapidly performed.
This SOP is suitable for any pathogen, because it is sequence independent and can be
utilized on both known and unknown agents and will simultaneously identify multiple
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agents. Finally, our collection of data suggests that our procedure can be implemented
and easily validated by institutional biosafety committees across research laboratories.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Viral sequencing. Prior to the generation of sequence data, an SOP was established for work at each
institution. These institutions include the J. Craig Venter Institute (JCVI), University of Wisconsin—
Madison, Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), University of Maryland School of Medicine, and
University of North Carolina—Chapel Hill. A detailed, standardized protocol describing all procedures
and reagents is supplied in the supplemental material. Briefly, total RNA was extracted from viral stocks,
virus-infected cells, or virus-infected tissues. Random hexamer oligonucleotides coupled with unique
barcodes (denoted BC-N6) were used for first-strand cDNA (Life Technologies) and second-strand DNA
(New England Biolabs) synthesis. The first-strand cDNA synthesis step also includes treatment with RNase
H (catalog no. M0297S; New England Biolabs) (see Text S1 in the supplemental material). A second
primer, specific for each barcode but lacking a random hexamer, was then used to generate PCR
fragments ranging in size from approximately 300 to 1,000 bp (Life Technologies). An example of a BC-N6
primer sequence is 5=-TAGTACACTCTAGAGCACTANNNNNN-3=, and the corresponding PCR primer se-
quence is 5=-TAGTACACTCTAGAGCACTA-3=. In order to overcome the problems associated with low
diversity in the first cycles of Illumina reads (33), we modified the SISPA protocol by adding either 3 N’s
or 4 N’s to the 5= ends of the SISPA PCR primers for each barcode, and using an equimolar combination
of these modified primers during the PCR amplification step of the protocol. A list of BC-N6 and PCR
primer sequences has been described previously (15). All SOP products were treated with an RNase
cocktail (Life Technologies) and purified (Qiagen). A subset of samples were subjected to heat inactiva-
tion at 72°C for 30 min. All BSL-3 samples that required the loss of virus and RNA infectivity were
subjected to testing consistent with the specific institutional biosafety standards. Final products of the
SOP were shipped to JCVI, pooled, and sequenced on the Illumina MiSeq (two 300-bp paired end [PE]
sequencing reads), Illumina HiSeq (two 100-bp PE), Illumina NextSeq (two 150-bp PE), or Ion Torrent (318
Chip 400-bp kit) platforms.
Postsequencing genomic analyses. A combination of JCVI-developed and CLCbio-developed com-
mand line tools were used to process read data from all NGS runs. Duplicate reads were removed, reads
were demultiplexed based on each sample’s specific barcode sequence, and reads were both sequence
trimmed to remove the barcode and random hexamer and quality trimmed to remove low-quality bases.
SISPA barcodes are designed to have a minimum edit distance of 5 between any two barcodes, such that
during demultiplexing, two errors may be allowed when searching for barcode sequences at the termini
of reads. For barcode demultiplexing, we used bespoke software available from http://sourceforge.net/
projects/deconvolver/ to identify SISPA barcode sequences, bin and trim the barcode and random
hexamer, but other software packages may be used as well. For samples with a known input sequence,
reads were mapped to a prespecified reference sequence. For samples with an unknown input sequence,
reads were de novo assembled, and the resulting contigs longer than 500 nucleotides (nt) were used to
search for the most appropriate reference sequences available in GenBank, using NCBI’s BLASTN against
the NT database, with a filter for viruses (taxonomy identifier [ID] [taxid]10239). Once the closest
references were chosen, reads were mapped to the selected references. For all analyses, the number of
reads that mapped to the references, the percent genome coverage from these mappings, and the
number of unmapped reads were determined. When sufficient sequence depth was available, single
nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) were determined using JCVI custom software. This pipeline applies
statistical tests to minimize false-positive SNP calls that could be caused by the types of sequence-
specific errors (SSE) that may occur in Illumina reads previously identified and described (21). Once a
minimumminor allele frequency threshold and significance level are established by the user, the number
of minor allele observations and major allele observations in each direction and the minimum minor
allele frequency threshold are used to calculate a P value based on the binomial distribution cumulative
probability, and if the P values calculated in each of the two sequencing directions are both less than the
Bonferroni-corrected significance level, then the SNP call is accepted. For our analyses, we used a
significance level of 0.05 (Bonferroni corrected for tests in each direction to 0.025), and a minimum minor
allele frequency threshold of 3%.
FMDV methods. (i) FMDV stocks and viral infectivity studies. For FMDV, transcribed RNA from
FMDV A24 Cruzeiro infectious clone (34) and LFBK v6 cells were used to assess the presence or
absence of viral infectivity (8). LFBK v6 cells were used to assess the presence or absence of viral
infectivity as previously described (8). Cells were propagated using Dulbecco’s modified Eagle medium
(DMEM) supplemented with 10% fetal bovine serum (FBS) and antibiotics and incubated at 37°C in 5%
CO2 (35). Briefly, T25 flasks seeded with LFBK v6 cells for 48 h were rinsed and inoculated with SISPA
products in 2 ml of serum-free medium. After 1 h of adsorption, 3 ml of medium with 1% serum were
added to the flasks, and the flasks were incubated for 72 h at 37°C on a rocking platform. Samples in
which no infectivity was observed were amplified through three blind passages.
(ii) FMDV RNA infectivity studies. BHK-21 cells (baby hamster kidney cell strain 21, clone 13; ATCC
CCL10) were used for electroporations. Cells were maintained in minimal essential medium (MEM)
containing 10% tryptose phosphate broth, 10% calf serum, and 1% antibiotics and nonessential amino
acids (Gibco-BRL/Invitrogen). SISPA products or FMDV RNA were electroporated as previously described
(36). The electroporation products were subsequently passaged on LFBK v6 cells as described above
to assess viral infectivity for a total of three blind passages. To determine the limit of recovery for our
system, we electroporated serial dilutions of quantified recombinant wild-type A24 RNA (37). The
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electroporation products were passaged a minimum of three times on LFBK v6 cells, with infectivity
visually checked daily.
(iii) RNA isol ation, cDNA synthesis, and FMDV detection by qPCR. Total RNA was isolated from
supernatants of cell lysates previously electroporated with viral RNA, cDNA, or SISPA using either the
Qiagen RNeasy kit (Valencia, CA) or the MagMax-96 viral RNA isolation kit (Ambion) on a KingFisher
magnetic particle processor (Thermo Scientific) for high-throughput analysis. RNA was treated with
RNase-free DNase I (Sigma-Aldrich). Superscript III reverse transcriptase (RT) (Life Technologies) was used
for cDNA synthesis following the manufacturer’s instructions. cDNA was diluted 1:100 and run in
duplicate following as described previously for FMDV (38) using Path-ID quantitative PCR (qPCR) reagents
(Applied Biosystems) in a 7500 thermocycler (Applied Biosystems). Samples were considered positive
when threshold cycle(CT) values were 40.
(iv) FMDV thermal stability study. A virus stock of FMDV A24 was prepared at 2  105 PFU/ml.
Quadruplicate tubes were heated at 72°C for 5 min, 72°C for 30 min, and 72°C for 60 min or 4°C for 60 min
(control). Samples were then stored at 70°C for further titration by plaque assay (39).
WNV methods. (i) WNV stocks and RNA isolation. Two stocks of WNV were used in the studies.
One stock (WNV 3356K) was a biological isolate. Another stock (FL-WNV) was derived from an infectious
cDNA clone of WNV 3356K, as previously described (22). FL-WNV contains three silent mutations
engineered into the infectious clone and, thus, can be differentiated from WNV 3356K (22). Titers of virus
stocks were determined on African green monkey kidney cells (Vero; ATCC CCL-81).
RNA was isolated from samples with the Qiagen RNeasy kit according to the manufacturer’s
instructions. The initial sample volume was 100 l, and isolated RNA was eluted in 30 l RNase-free
water. All animal studies that resulted in tissue sample harvest were approved by IACUC at the University
of Wisconsin—Madison. RNA was isolated from tissues using a combination of Trizol reagent (Life
Technologies) and the Qiagen RNeasy kit. Tissue sections (3 mm by 3 mm by 3 mm) from the brains,
spleens, and livers of mice were placed in 0.5 ml Trizol with a 0.18-inch diameter steel ball and
homogenized with a Qiagen mixer mill for 4 min at 24 cycles/s. The process was repeated as needed until
complete homogenization was observed. The samples were incubated for 10 min at room temperature
(rt) prior to the addition of 100 l of chloroform. Samples were mixed, incubated for 2 min at rt, and
centrifuged for 12,000 g for 15 min at 4°C. The aqueous fraction was transferred to a fresh tube, mixed
with 300 l of cold 70% ethanol, and added to an RNeasy column, and RNA was extracted following the
manufacturer’s instructions. rRNA was depleted from 2 g of total RNA using the RiboZero Magnetic kit
(Epicentre, Madison, WI) according to the manufacturer’s instructions.
(ii) WNV viral infectivity studies. RNA was isolated as described above, and SISPA libraries were
generated according to the universal standard operating procedure. One to three SISPA libraries were
pooled, and 15 l of the pool was added to 1 ml virus diluent (MEM plus 1% FBS). A negative-control
sample (diluent alone) and a positive-control sample containing 100 PFU were prepared in parallel. The
1-ml samples were inoculated into a T25 flask of Vero cells (18) and incubated at 37°C and 5% CO2 for
1 h, rocking every 15 min. Five milliliters of complete medium (MEM plus 10% FBS) was added to each
flask, and the cells were incubated at 37°C and 5% CO2 for 4 days. Monolayers were monitored daily for
cytopathic effect (CPE). If CPE was apparent, aliquots were collected and frozen at80°C, and the sample
was no longer passaged. If no CPE was present 4 days postinoculation (dpi), 1 ml of supernatant from
each flask was inoculated onto fresh Vero cells, initiating the infection process again for a total of three
passages. To determine the limit of detection for infectious virus, 10-fold dilutions of WNV (102 to
103 PFU) were inoculated onto Vero cells and subjected to four rounds of blind passaging as described
above. The experiment was run in triplicate. CPE was evident in all cells infected with at least 1 PFU by
the second passage. Mild CPE developed in one flask infected with 0.1 PFU at the fourth passage. No CPE
was observed in cells infected with less than 0.1 PFU.
(iii) WNV RNA infectivity studies. The presence of infectious WNV RNA in SISPA libraries was
assayed by electroporation of BHK-21 cells followed by serial passage on Vero cells. BHK-21 cells were
trypsinized, washed, and resuspended in PBS at a concentration of 1.25  107 cells/ml in preparation for
electroporation. Cells (0.8 ml) were mixed with 15 l of water, 15 l of SISPA pool, or 10 l of water plus
5 l of WNV RNA (isolated from virus stock as described above) in a 0.4-mm-gap electroporation cuvette.
The cell mixture was pulsed in an electroporator (BioRad, Richmond, CA) three times at 850 V for 0.4 s
with 3-s rests. The cells were incubated for 10 min at rt before they were transferred to a flask containing
15 ml warmed complete medium. The cells were grown at 37°C and 5% CO2 and were observed daily
for CPE. After 4 days, 1 ml of supernatant from each flask was inoculated onto Vero cells, and the samples
were serially passaged as described above.
To determine the limit of rescue for infectious RNA in our system, BHK-21 cells were mixed with
10-fold dilutions of WNV RNA (105 to 108 genomic equivalents [GE]) of WNV and electroporated in
triplicate. GE were calculated from isolated viral RNA using real-time RT-PCR (40). Cell supernatants were
inoculated onto Vero cells and subjected to four blind passages. CPE rapidly developed in cells that were
transfected with 107 or 108 GE, while no CPE developed in cells transfected with less than 107 GE. SISPA
libraries were considered free from infectious virus or RNA if no CPE was observed by the end of the third
passage on Vero cells. As a secondary test for infectious material, 100 l of supernatant from the final
passage of each sample was inoculated onto Vero cells in duplicate. The infection was allowed to
continue for 2 days, at which time monolayers were fixed and examined for virus antigen by immuno-
fluorescence. Monolayers were stained with mouse hyperimmune ascitic fluid (CDC; 1:100) followed by
fluorescein isothiocyanate (FITC)-conjugated goat anti-mouse (KPL; 1:100) and visualized with a Nikon
Eclipse TS100 fluorescence microscope. Viral antigen was observed in all wells inoculated with positive-
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control WNV samples but was absent in all wells inoculated with negative-control or SISPA library
supernatant.
HRV-16 and HRV-14 methods. (i) HRV viral stocks and quantitative PCR. The pWR3.26 molecular
clone was obtained from the ATCC to rescue HRV-14 viral stocks, while the pR16.11 plasmid was obtained
from the ATCC to generate HRV-16 viral stocks (GenBank accession no. L24917). Supernatants containing
infectious virus for both HRV-16 and HRV-14 were isolated and aliquoted. The GenBank reference
sequence for HRV-16 was used to design a quantitative reverse transcriptase PCR (qRT-PCR) TaqMan
primer/probe set: TaqMan forward primer, 5=-GGTTAAATGGATGTTAAGAATTATATCAGCTATGGTTATA-3=;
TaqMan reverse primer, 5=-CATCCAATCAGTGTTAAAGTGGCAAT-3=; TaqMan probe, 6-carboxyfluorescein
(FAM)-CAGATCCGCAAACAAT. To isolate RNA, supernatant after each passage was frozen at 80°C and
subsequently subjected to RNA extraction using a Qiagen RNeasy kit. RNA was treated with RNase-free
DNase I. Reverse transcription was performed with Superscript III reverse transcriptase (Invitrogen). As a
negative control to monitor contamination, water was used in place of Superscript III reverse transcrip-
tase, and in each case, reverse transcription was performed with oligo(dT) priming. cDNA was diluted to
1:100 and run in duplicate using the TaqMan custom HRV-16 custom primers and probe on the Applied
Biosystems 7500 platform.
(ii) HRV RNA infectivity studies. H1 HeLa cells (CRL-1958) were used to assess the presence or
absence of viral infectivity as visualized by CPE. Cells were propagated in six-well plates using DMEM
supplemented with 10% fetal bovine serum and incubated at 35°C in 5% CO2 for 24 h. RNA transfection
was performed using 10 l of RNA, cDNA, or SISPA product following the TransIT-mRNA transfection kit
protocol (Mirus). After transfection, cells were incubated at 35°C for 72 h, and CPE was observed daily.
Samples determined to be CPE negative were used in passage 2. Specifically, 500 l of supernatant from
passage 1 was used to infect fresh cells at 35°C for 1 h. After 1 h, 1.8 ml of DMEM (1) with 10% FBS was
added to each well, and the cells were incubated at 35°C for 72 h. CPE was observed daily. Samples
deemed CPE negative were used in passage 3 following the same protocol as that used for passage 2.
For all experiments, an HRV-16 genomic RNA was transfected in parallel as a positive control for RNA
infectivity. For large-scale loss of RNA infectivity studies, the SOP was performed on 44 HRV-16 samples
and 44 HRV-14 samples in a 96-well format. Briefly, 12.5 l from each well was used to make eight tubes
of 137.5 l (pooling material from A1-A11, B1-B11, C1-C11, etc.). H1 HeLa cells were propagated in petri
dishes using DMEM supplemented with 10% fetal bovine serum. Next, 137.5 l of SISPA products was
transfected into each petri dish using the TransIT-mRNA transfection kit (Mirus). Cells were incubated at
35°C for at least 72 h and monitored daily for the appearance of CPE. If no CPE observed, 3 ml of
supernatant from each petri dish was inoculated into fresh HeLa cells. This was repeated for a total of
three passages. For all experiments, an HRV-16 genomic RNA was transfected in parallel as a positive
control for RNA infectivity.
To determine the limit of detection for infectious RNA, RNA was isolated from 10-fold dilutions of
HRV-16 virion particles. RNA was transfected onto H1 HeLa cells using the TransIT-mRNA transfection kit
(Mirus) and subjected to three rounds of blind passaging. CPE was evident in all cells infected with at
least 0.1 PFU by the second passage. No CPE was observed in cells infected with less than 0.01 PFU (data
not shown). The limit of infectivity for infectious RNA was reproducible over multiple replicates.
(iii) HRV16 viral infectivity studies. For studies of large-scale loss of viral infectivity, the SOP was
performed on 44 HRV-16 samples and 44 HRV-14 samples in a 96-well format. The final eluted volume
was 50 l and was divided into four aliquots. To reduce the amount of CPE testing, samples in all rows
were pooled prior to CPE testing. Briefly, 12.5 l from each well was used to make eight tubes of 137.5 l
(pooling material from A1-A11, B1-B11, C1-C11, etc.). Target H1 HeLa cells were propagated in T75 flasks
using DMEM supplemented with 10% fetal bovine serum and incubated at 35°C. For infectivity studies,
the supernatant was removed, and the pooled 137.5 l was mixed with 3 ml of infection medium (1
DMEM plus 1% FBS). This mix was used to infect T75 flasks for 1 h, gently rocking flasks every 20 min.
After 1 h, the medium was replaced, and flasks were incubated at 35°C for 72 h. If no CPE was observed,
3 ml of supernatant from each flask was inoculated into fresh HeLa cells. This was repeated for a total
of three passages. For all experiments, infectious HRV-16 viral particles served as a positive control for
CPE.
To determine the limit of detection for infectious virus, 10-fold dilutions of HRV-16 were inoculated
onto H1 HeLa cells and subjected to three rounds of blind passaging as described above. CPE was
evident in all cells infected with at least 0.1 PFU by the second passage. No CPE was observed in cells
infected with less than 0.01 PFU (data not shown). The limit of infectivity for infectious virus was
reproducible over multiple replicates.
Alphavirus methods (alphavirus stocks, SISPA reactions, and infectivity assays). Alphavirus
SISPA testing was done using either an infectious-clone-derived GirdwoodS.A. strain of Sindbis virus
(SINV) (41) or an infectious-clone-derived vaccine strain (181/25) of CHIKV (42), which was generously
provided by Terry Dermody, Vanderbilt University. These infectious clones were engineered to express
the mKate fluorescent protein followed by the FMDV 2a protease in frame between the viral capsid and
E3 gene as previously described (43). All virus stocks were generated by production of virus length
genomic RNA using SP6 mMessage mMachine RNA transcription kits (Ambion), which was electropo-
rated into BHK-21 cells as described previously (44). Titers of each viral stock were determined using our
standard plaque assay protocol on Vero cells (17).
SISPA reactions were tested for the presence of infectious SINV or CHIKV on Vero cells. Briefly, 15 l
of the pooled SISPA library was mixed with 1 ml of complete MEM (MEM plus 10% FBS, L-glutamine
[L-glut], and penicillin-streptomycin [pen-strep]), and the Vero cells were placed in T25 flasks for 1 h, with
rocking every 15 min at 37°C and 5% CO2. At the end of the 1-h incubation, 4 ml of complete medium
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was added to the flask. A mock control flask received complete medium alone. The first-passage
monolayers (P:1) were maintained for 72 h, with the monolayers assessed for cytopathic effect and red
fluorescence daily. At 72 h, 20% of supernatant from the passage 1 flask was introduced onto a new
monolayer (P:2) using the same 1-h infection protocol, and the flasks were maintained for 72 h, with the
monolayers assessed for CPE and red fluorescence every 24 h. Next, 20% of the P:2 supernatant was then
placed on a third monolayer (P:3) and monitored for an additional 72 h. To assess assay sensitivity, the
CPE protocol was also performed using 1 ml of complete medium containing 100, 10, 1, or 0.1 PFU of
SINV or CHIKV. The assay sensitivity routinely ranged from 0.1 to 1 PFU.
To test alphavirus RNA inactivation in SISPA reactions, 107 BHK cells were electroporated with 15 l of the
pooled SISPA SINV or CHIKV libraries, and seeded into T75 flasks with 15 ml MEM supplemented with 10%
FBS, L-glut, and pen-strep. Monolayers were maintained for 72 h at 37°C and assessed for CPE and red
fluorescence every 24 h. At 72 h, 3 ml (20%) of supernatant was transferred to a new T75 flask of Vero cells
(P:2), which were monitored for CPE every day for 72 h, at which point 20% of the supernatant from P:2 was
placed on a third monolayer (P:3) of Vero cells, which was assessed for CPE for 72 h.
MERS-CoV methods. (i) Virus and cells. The Jordan MERS-CoV strain (GenBank accession no.
KC776174.1, MERS-CoV-Hu/Jordan-N3/2012) was kindly provided by Kanta Subbarao (National Institutes
of Health, Bethesda, MD), Gabriel Defang (Naval Medical Research Unit 3 [NAMRU-3], Cairo, Egypt),
Michael Cooper (Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center [AFHSC]) and Emad Mohereb (NAMRU-3). All
experiments with live MERS-CoV (Jordan) were performed under biosafety level 3 conditions at the
University of Maryland School of Medicine. Vero E6 (monkey kidney epithelial cells, ATCC CRL-1586) for
plaque assays were grown in minimal essential medium (Corning) supplemented with 10% (vol/vol) FBS
(Sigma Aldrich), 1% L-glutamine (Gibco) and 1% penicillin-streptomycin (Gemini Bio-Products) at 37°C in
a 5% CO2 atmosphere.
(ii) MERS-CoV quantification and safety testing. To determine the titers of live MERS-CoV, media
from infected cells and processed RNA were placed on Vero E6 cells to determine the titer in PFU per
milliliter as previously described (45). To quantify the infectivity of samples throughout the described
RNA isolation protocol, RNA or cDNA intermediates or final purified products were used to infect Vero
E6 cells in a six-well plate (1 106 cells per well). The cells were passaged every 48 h for 3 blind passages
for each well, and CPE was examined.
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